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COMMENT: BACK TO THE BAD OLD DAYS:
PRESIDENT PUTIN’S HOLD ON FREE SPEECH
IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Rebecca Favret
“The KGB chief, their number one saint/
Will escort protesters off to jail.”1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper addresses new laws promulgated in Russia that re-
strict freedom of speech. Each implicitly reflects the Kremlin’s hostil-
ity toward political dissidence in the aftermath of serious protests
following President Putin’s reelection and elections to the legislature.
Disturbed by the outcry, which took place in cities across Russia but
also infiltrated the Internet, the Russian legislature passed strict laws
censoring Internet speech, prohibiting behavior and speech deemed
“extremist,” and curbing the size and type of public gatherings.
The new legislation is examined through the lens of some of the
Kremlin’s most infamous and recent targets: namely, the Internet
blacklist and the Pussy Riot scandal. It is critical to note that these
instances are only a fraction of the free speech violations that are now
legal in the Russian Federation. These incidents—and the potential
for similar and more serious results under the new laws—are of grave
importance. For many Western critics and Russian citizens, the laws
confirm their worst fears about Putin’s autocratic leanings: that with
the stifling of free speech will come a complete unraveling of Russian
democracy. The effect is a grim future for the former Soviet Union
eerily reminiscent of the past.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a long-standing principle that freedom of speech is at the
core of a functioning democracy. For purposes of democratic legiti-
macy, free speech is a necessity more critical than suffrage. A
1 Lyrics from a Pussy Riot song, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
hostile approach to political dissenters. In her closing statements immediately pre-
ceding her conviction, band member Nadezhda Tolokonnikova noted the prophetic
nature of the lyrics. See Adam Taylor, Here’s What Russian Punk Band Pussy Riot
Said at the Conclusion of Their Controversial Blasphemy Trial, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Aug. 10, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/pussy-riot-trial-
nadezhda-tolokonnikovas-closing-statement-2012-8#ixzz23RAu7eW7.
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speaker’s freedom to express his or her viewpoint implicitly carries
with it the right of potential audiences to hear and access that view-
point. Access to information, in a political context or otherwise, is a
crucial component of autonomy. Without it, decision-making is signifi-
cantly hindered. Despite the existence of a popular vote, if voters are
unable to independently make decisions because of a lack of informa-
tion, democracy inevitably erodes.
The importance of free speech is the foundation for Western
concerns over recent legislation in Russia curtailing the right to free
expression. Amid contentions that he rigged the recent Duma (parlia-
ment) elections, President Putin has asserted even more political con-
trol by pushing numerous laws through the legislature that inhibit
free speech. This paper focuses on three of them: the anti-extremism
law, the Act for Information, and the amendments to the Law on Ral-
lies. Each serves to clamp down on political dissidence in one form or
another, either through personal actions, Internet speech, or activism
and protests.
II. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE UNDER PRESIDENT
PUTIN
Vladimir Putin has held political prominence in Russia since
the dawn of the twenty-first century.2 The former KGB agent-turned
Prime Minister is currently in his third six-year term as president.3
But his control runs even deeper than the already constitutionally su-
perior executive branch.4 In 2003, he formed his own political party,
United Russia, to serve as his proxy in the legislature, known as the
Duma.5 After the 2011 elections, members of the United Russia party
comprised 70 percent of the seats in the legislature.6 The results were
2 Then-Prime Minister Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian
Federation in May 2000. He served two four-year terms as President and then
stepped aside, assuming the role of Prime Minister, because the Russian Constitu-
tion prohibits three consecutive presidential terms. Dmitry Medvedev assumed
the presidency, with the understanding that he would step down so Putin could
run once Medvedev’s term expired. See, e.g., Ellen Barry, Putin Once More Moves
to Assume Russia’s Top Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, at A1.
3 World’s Most Powerful People: Vladimir Putin, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
profile/vladimir-putin/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
4 See Gordon L. Bowen, Russian Legislative and Electoral Systems, MARY BALD-
WIN COLLEGE, http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/duma.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2013).
5 Id. Note that the United Russia Party was originally called One Russia. Id.
6 Kathy Lally, Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party Wins Regional Elections,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-15/
world/35500413_1_regional-elections-election-results-political-technologies. The
result of the legislative elections was the subject of considerable protest through-
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so overwhelming in part because, since 2004, when Putin and the
Duma passed legislation prohibiting non-party members from seeking
election, only candidates from approved parties have been permitted to
run for election.7 Additionally, amid allegations of fraud, only 25 per-
cent of Russians turned out to vote in the 2011 elections with the ma-
jority abstaining in protest.8
In light of the allegedly corrupt electoral process, the correla-
tion between freedom of expression and democracy has become tangi-
ble in Russia. While the Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of
speech,9 the government either directly or indirectly controls every na-
tional television network.10 At least 19 journalists have been mur-
dered after publicly opposing President Putin, and the half-hearted
investigations into their deaths have yet to yield a conviction.11 Well-
known dissidents have been jailed on trumped-up charges.12
With his combination of intimidation tactics and ability to ef-
fectively handpick the nation’s legislature, Putin is able to further con-
trol opposition to his leadership. Just in the months following the most
recent legislative election, Putin has pushed through numerous laws
that stifle free speech and the media in an effort to stamp out criti-
cism.13 Opponents of the President have been swiftly silenced—either
through prosecution and imprisonment under the new laws14 or
out Russia, discussed infra. For a discussion of Putin’s relationship with the
United Russia Party in the legislature as “electoral authoritarianism,” see Sean
Roberts, Dominant-Power Politics and ‘Virtual’ Hegemony: The Role of United
Russia in the Putin Period (2010) (Ph.D dissertation, University of Birmingham)
(on file with University of Birmingham).
7 Bowen, supra note 4.
8 Lally, supra note 6.
9 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 29
(Russ.), available at http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm (“Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech. The propaganda or agita-
tion instigating social, racial, national, or religious hatred and strife shall not be
allowed.”).
10 Freedom in the World 2012: Russia, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedom
house.org/report/freedom-world/2012/russia-0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Law on Protecting Children from Information
Harmful to Their Health and Development, FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON [FZ] [Federal
Law] 2012, No. 139 (requiring that websites with information deemed harmful to
children be blacklisted); Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity, FED-
ERAL’NYI ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law] 2002, No. 114, available at http://www.legisla
tionline.org/documents/id/4368].
14 See, e.g., FREE PUSSY RIOT, http://freepussyriot.org/about (last visited Jan. 2,
2013); see generally James Brooke, Analysis: Political Winter Descends over Rus-
sia, VOICE OF AMERICA, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/analysis-
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through extra-legal tactics, including the mysterious disappearances
and blatant assassinations of vocal dissidents.15 Silencing critics in
Russia is nothing new,16 but the government has seemingly renewed
its crusade against opposition through legislation that stifles free
speech.17
The government’s uneasiness regarding political speech comes
on the heels of a massive uprising following the 2012 election, which
was tainted by allegations of fraud, and extended up through the eve
of Putin’s inauguration.18 Protests raged in over 50 cities, marking the
first widespread anti-Putin demonstration since he first took office in
2000.19 In December, the For Fair Elections rally drew a crowd of
30,000, demanding that the Duma elections be recalled.20 Virtually,
political-winter-descends-on-russia/1531876.html (“President Putin has methodi-
cally reduced civic space in Russia by advocating new laws on treason, blasphemy,
libel, Internet censorship and curbs on public protest.”).
15 See, e.g., Journalists Killed in Russia, COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
JOURNALISTS, http://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). In
2010, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed Russia as the fourth-
most dangerous nation in the world for journalists. The Five Most Dangerous
Countries for Journalists, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2010/1108/The-five-most-dangerouscountries-
forjournalists/Russia; Two More Critics of Vladimir Putin Take Bullets in the
Head, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 20, 2009 (The aptly titled article discusses the as-
sassinations of a human rights lawyer, Stanislav Markelov, and an opposition
journalist, Anastasia Baburova, days after they held a press conference condemn-
ing Putin’s leadership.).
16 See generally Partial Justice: An Inquiry Into the Deaths of Journalists in Rus-
sia, 1993-2009 (John Crowfoot, ed., 2009), available at http://www.ifex.org/russia/
2009/06/23/ifj_partial_justice_report.pdf (reporting that over 300 journalists were
killed in Russia between 1993 and 2009, either during the performance of profes-
sional duties such as being caught in the crossfire while reporting during war
times, or assassinated for political reasons, or were reported missing and never
found).
17 See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Law on Protecting Children from Information
Harmful to Their Health and Development, supra note 13(requiring that websites
with information deemed harmful to children be blacklisted); Federal Law on
Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, supra note 13.
18 Zack Whittaker, Russia’s Internet Blacklist Looms in Freedom Crackdown,
CNET NEWS (July 6, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57466592-38/rus-
sias-internet-blacklist-looms-in-freedom-crackdown/.
19 Id. Over 7,000 people participated in an election protest in St. Petersburg, and
4,000 rallied in Novosibirsk, despite the temperature being -20 degrees Celsius.
Miriam Elder, Russians Come Out in Force To Protest Against Alleged Electoral
Fraud, OBSERVER, Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/10/
russia-protests-election-vladimir-putin.
20 See generally Russia’s Opposition Protests Chronology, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFOR-
MATION AGENCY, Sept. 14, 2012, http://rapsinews.com/publications/20120914/2646
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thousands of Russians protested Putin’s third presidential election,
creating blogs and websites demanding that votes be recounted and
alleging that the election was rigged.21 Prominent blogger Alexei
Navalny, who has since been jailed,22 took his anti-corruption crusade
to new levels after Putin’s re-election when he launched the Good Ma-
chine of Truth (GMT).23 The project condemns Putin’s United Russia
political party and aims to educate Russians about government cor-
ruption.24 After opening the site, Navalny became the target of an im-
plausible embezzlement investigation that most view as an attempt to
silence his infamous criticism of Putin.25
Fully illustrating the context in which these new laws are be-
ing implemented is additional legislation, recently adopted, that re-
flects the Putin regime’s anti-democratic principles. In November
2012, a law went into effect requiring all foreign non-commercial orga-
nizations and non-governmental organizations to register with the
government as “foreign agents.”26 Registration subjects foreign agents
to substantial surveillance and financial audits by the government.27
Moreover, the Duma newly reversed legislation that had, just seven
76534.html (including a chronology of the entire series of opposition protests from
December 2011 to September 2012).
21 Whittaker, supra note 18.
22 Navalny was arrested in 2012 on what most believe to be fabricated embezzle-
ment charges. This is the third allegation of embezzlement leveled against
Nalvany; all three investigations came in the wake of a protest organized by
Navalny or anti-government Internet campaign such as the Good Machine of
Truth. See, e.g., Ellen Barry, Russia Charges Anticorruption Activist in Plan To
Steal Timber, July 31, 2012, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/01/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-charged-with-embezzlement.html?_r=0;
Max Seddon, Alexei Navalny, Russia Opposition Leader, Accused of Financial Cor-
ruption, Dec. 14, 2012, HUFFINGTON POST, available at  http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/12/14/alexei-navalny-fraud_n_2300393.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
23 Profile: Russian Blogger Alexei Navalny, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-16057045 (last visited Jan. 12, 1013).
24 Dobraya Mashina Pravdi (Good Machine of Truth), MASHINA.ORG (last visited
Jan. 12, 2013) (translated by the author).
25 Max Seddon, Alexei Navalny, Russia Opposition Leader, Accused of Financial
Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/14/alexei-navalny-fraud_n_2300393.html.
26 Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-Commercial Organizations Perform-
ing the Function of Foreign Agents. See also NCO Law Monitor: Russia, INFORMA-
TION CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/
russia.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
27 INFORMATION CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, supra note 26.
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months prior, made defamation an administrative offense.28 Now, def-
amation is back in the Criminal Code.29 UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, said of the re-criminalization of
defamation:
“There is a lot of concern that making defamation a crim-
inal offense will stifle all criticism of Government au-
thorities and limit the ability of individuals to address
issues of transparency, corruption, and abuse of power. I
urge the Government of the Russian Federation to avoid
taking further steps backward to a more restrictive era,
and to make strenuous efforts to limit the detrimental
effects of the laws and amendments already passed over
the last few weeks.”30
Anti-Western sentiment was further espoused in Putin’s Sep-
tember 2012 termination of Russia’s partnership with USAID, signal-
ing the end of collaboration between the two nations in helping develop
the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet era.31 Most recently, an em-
phatic anti-Western enactment by the Duma sparked an international
outrage when it formally outlawed U.S. adoptions of Russian
orphans.32
28 Russia’s New Laws Could Have Serious Negative Impact on Human Rights –
U.N. Official, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, July 18, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=42497#.ULeZCWA1Yb0 (“In just two months, we have seen a
worrying shift in the legislative environment governing the enjoyment of freedoms
of assembly, association, speech and information in the Russian Federation. [. . .]
At least four new provisions have been made that will have a detrimental effect on
human rights in this country.”).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 David M. Herszenhorn, With Aid Cutoff, Kremlin Recalibrates, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/europe/as-kremlin-ends-
us-aid-critics-see-bid-to-quell-dissent.html?_r=0.
32  See On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation, informally Dima Yakovlev
Act, Dec. 26, 2012, 272-FZ  (unofficially translated by RT.com); See, e.g., Madison
Park, Russia’s Lower House Approves Bill To Ban U.S. Adoption, CNN, Dec. 27,
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/21/world/europe/russia-us-adoption-ban/index.
html; Duma Retaliates Against U.S. With Adoption Ban, NGO Restrictions, Black-
list, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFORMATION AGENCY, Dec. 21, 2012 (explaining that the
adoption ban was a retaliatory gesture by Russia after the United States signed
the Magnitsky Act, imposing sanctions against Russians who have been involved
in human rights violations).
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III. CURTAILING SPEECH
A. Laws Against Extremism and the Pussy Riot Scandal
A federal law “on combating extremist activity” was adopted in
2002 and broadly prohibits the dissemination of “extremist” informa-
tion through personal activities, media, the Internet, or mass gather-
ings.33 In addition to stirring up racial or religious discord, obstruction
of justice, and promoting terrorism, the first activity on the list of pro-
hibited “extremist” activities is “forcible change of the foundations of
the constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the Russian
Federation.”34 This provision has the potential to be construed liber-
ally enough to disallow all civil activism, critical language, or govern-
ment protest—if the activity or language is not already prohibited by
other new laws, as discussed in Parts B and C, infra.
A first casualty of the anti-extremism laws gained global noto-
riety in February 2012. Members of an anonymous, feminist punk rock
band, Pussy Riot, staged a political protest during a Moscow church
service.35 The performance was an act of protest against President Pu-
tin’s increasingly authoritative rule and the growing role of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church in the political regime.36 It lasted forty-one
seconds.37 Despite its brevity, the unwelcome concert became the sub-
ject of a criminal investigation after a video of the song appeared on
YouTube, amassing over 600,000 views in the first day.38 The song’s
opposition to President Putin (“Virgin Mary, Mother of God, put Putin
away/ Put Putin away, put Putin away!”) was deemed an act of relig-
ious hatred by Kirill I, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church,
and the women were charged under the law against extremism.39
The three artists, who are no longer anonymous but are known
throughout the world: Maria Alyokhina, Yekaterina Samutesevich,
and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, were arrested on criminal charges of
33 Federal Law on Counteraction of Extremist Activities, July 25, 2002, No. 114-
FZ (unofficially translated by the Council of Europe).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. The Church has seen increased influence over the federal government since
the 1990s and is highly visible in Russian secular life. For a discussion, see Amy
Liedy, The Orthodox Church in Russian Politics, WILSON CENTER KENNAN INSTI-
TUTE, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-orthodox-church-and-russian-
politics (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
37 See Take Action for Pussy Riot, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://takeaction.
amnestyusa.org/c.60JCLQPAJiJUG/b.8465995/K.6DQD/Pussy_Riot_writeathon/
siteapps/advocacy/ActionItem.aspk (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
38 Free Pussy Riot, supra note 14.
39 Id.
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hooliganism.40 Samutesevich’s sentence was suspended when the
Court learned that she had merely been outside of the church during
the demonstration, but Alyokhina and Tolkonnikova were given two-
year sentences in two of the most notoriously inhumane Siberian labor
camps, hundreds of miles from their homes and children in Moscow.41
Concededly, Pussy Riot’s actions were designed to incite politi-
cal change, and their actions did violate the anti-extremism law.42
Samutsevich did not attempt to hide the band’s political aims, com-
menting to a reporter, “Our art is meant to make the entire world
laugh at Putin, so that not a single self-respecting leader would agree
to sit down at the same table with him.”43
The issue, then, is not simply whether Pussy Riot violated the
anti-extremism law in attempting to incite political change; they bla-
tantly did. The contention instead posed by human rights activists is
that the law does not clearly define extremism and, in effect, the law
itself is a violation of human rights.44 The Center for Information
Analysis, a Russian nonprofit organization, monitors government mis-
uses of counter-extremism legislation and has condemned the applica-
tion of the statute to the Pussy Riot protest.45 The law under which
40 See, e.g, id.
41 See, e.g., id. Their right to freedom of speech was not Pussy Riot’s only constitu-
tional guarantee violated. Leading up to their trial, the women were illegally
placed under 24-hour video surveillance after the Pussy Riot scandal was labeled
of “special importance” by the prosecution team. See also Masha and Nadya To
Serve Sentences in Russia’s ‘Harshest Prisons’ in Perm and Mordovia, FREE PUSSY
RIOT (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.freepussyriot.org/news/masha-and-nadya-serve-
sentences-russias-harshest-prisons-perm-and-mordovia (Perm and Mordovia host
multiple prison camps, most of which reportedly represent the Soviet-era gulag, or
forced labor, system); Maria Alekhina Transferred to Solitary Cell in Berezniki
Prison Because She Received Threats of Physical Harm, FREE PUSSY RIOT (Nov. 22,
2012), http://www.freepussyriot.org/news/maria-alekhina-day-transferred-soli-
tary-cell-berezniki-prison-because-she-received-threats-phys.
42 See Federal Law on Combating Extremism of the Russian Federation, No. 114-
FZ, July 25, 2002 (unofficially translated by the Council of Europe).
43 Anna Nemstova, Pussy Riot’s Yekaterina Samutsevich Speaks Out, DAILY BEST,
Dec. 2, 2012, http://freepussyriot.org/articles.
44 See, e.g., Christopher Plummer, Protests Condemn Pussy Riot Verdict, Call for
Russia’s Awakening, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Aug. 21, 2012, http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/2012/08/21/protests-condemn-pussy-riot-verdict-call-for-russias-
awakening/; see generally We Will Not Be Silent: Free Pussy Riot, AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.amnestyusa.org/get-involved/take-action-
now.
45 SOVA: CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, http://www.sova-center.ru/en/
about-us/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); Alexander Verkhovsky, Inappropriate En-
forcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2011, SOVA: CENTER FOR IN-
FORMATION AND ANALYSIS, Apr. 27, 2012, http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/
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Pussy Riot was convicted raises concerns about the ability of Russians
to display any oppositional conduct.46
The anti-extremism statute is not restricted to Pussy Riot’s
punk performance or amateur criticism of Putin. The legislation has
been instrumental in stamping out even official political speech of
party opponents. Leading up to the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elec-
tion seasons, the legislation was instrumental in halting distribution
of informational campaign materials.47 Eventually, the concerns with
the seized brochures and newspapers would be deemed “unfounded,”
in most cases under the anti-extremism statute, but not until voting
had ended and their purpose had obviously and conveniently been nul-
lified.48 Similarly, commercials on behalf of the Just Russia party were
removed from circulation after the election commission concluded that
the commercials were “inciting social discord.”49
B. Internet Censorship in Russia
The government’s efforts to combat extremism also have impli-
cations for Internet speech. In November 2012, the legislature enacted
a new censorship law aimed at extremist web content.50 The Act for
Information authorizes government officials to blacklist websites dis-
playing information deemed harmful to children.51 Websites warrant-
reports-analyses/2012/04/d24302/; Natalia Yudina, Recommendations for the
OSCE Dublin Conference on Internet Freedom, SOVA: CENTER FOR INFORMATION
AND ANALYSIS, JUNE 20, 2012, available at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/
reports-analyses/2012/06/d25708/ (identifying “interrelation of countermeasures to
hate speech on the Internet and defense of freedom of expression on the Internet”
as an area that the Institute deemed “especially problematic.”).
46 Note that Pussy Riot’s performance would have also been outlawed under the
amendments to the Law on Rallies, which imposes strict regulations on permits
for public gatherings and outlaws numerous types of behavior during rallies, in-
cluding wearing masks, which the members of Pussy Riot always sport to preserve
their signature anonymity. See Main Amendments to Laws on Rallies, RUSSIAN
LEGAL INFORMATION AGENCY, http://rapsinews.com/legislation_mm/20120613/2634
37356.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
47 See generally SOVA: CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); Alexander Verkhovsky, supra note 45.
48 SOVA, supra note 48.
49 Id.
50 Russia Internet Blacklist Law Takes Effect, BBC NEWS TECH., 31 Oct. 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20096274 (last updated March 3, 2013,
8:06PM); Claire Bigg, Russia’s Internet ‘Blacklist’ Law Sparks Free-Speech Fears,
RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-internet-
blacklist-free-speech/24758022.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
51 Russia Internet Blacklist Law Takes Effect, supra note 50.
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ing censorship include those promoting child pornography, violence, or
substance abuse.52
While the law’s official purpose is to protect children from inap-
propriate material, the legislation can be read broadly enough to pro-
hibit much more. Not surprisingly, a Moscow court in November
ordered that any websites circulating videos of Pussy Riot’s perform-
ance be shut down pursuant to the anti-extremism law, as the video
was deemed a dangerous call to arms for Kremlin protestors across
Russia.53
No court order is necessary for authorities to remove a harmful
site from the web.54 The blacklist is managed by Roskomnadzor, the
federal service for telecom, information technology, and mass commu-
nication supervision.55 The watchdog service fields complaints from
citizens, who are encouraged to submit screenshots of offensive mate-
rial.56 Within twenty-four hours of the Act for Information’s legaliza-
tion, Roskomnadzor received over 5,000 complaints.57 Although many
of those complaints were rejected,58 over 180 websites have been shut
down since the law’s enactment.59 The blacklist in its entirety is not
public, but curious citizens can search a government-regulated regis-
try to see if a particular website has been blocked.60
Human rights organizations and journalist advocacy groups, as
well as the Russian search engine Yandex, the social media website
Mail.Ru, and Wikipedia’s Russian language affiliate, have all ex-
pressed concern over the government’s new role in monitoring Internet
speech.61
52 Id.
53 Russian Court Tries To Ban All Online Videos of Pussy Riot, BBC NEWS, Nov.
29, 2012, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/11/russian-court-tries-ban-
all-online-videos-pussy-riot/59433/.
54 See Olga Khazan, Russia’s Secret New Internet Blacklist, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/09/russias-se
cret-new-internet-blacklist/.
55 See Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Tech-
nologies and Mass Communications, ROSKOMNADZOR, http://www.rsoc.ru/eng/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2013).




60 See Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technol-
ogy and Mass Communication, supra note 55.
61 See Russia Internet Blacklist Law Takes Effect, supra note 50; see also Dara
Kerr, Wikipedia Blackout in Russia to Protest Censorship, CNET NEWS, July 9,
2012, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57469107-93/wikipedia-blackout-in-rus-
sia-to-protest-censorship/.
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Russia’s efforts to stamp out dissent online extend beyond its
own borders, revealing the motives of the Russian government to sup-
press anti-government dialogue.62 In July 2012, Russia proposed an
amendment to the United Nations’ International Telecommunications
Regulations Treaty that would have a similar impact as the Act for
Information.63 The amendment would restrict public access to web-
sites designed for “interfering in the internal affairs or undermining
the sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and public
safety of other states, or to divulge information of a sensitive na-
ture.”64 Though the United Nations failed to pass the amendment,65
the proposal suggests Russia’s intolerance for government opposition.
Other former Soviet countries have followed in Russia’s foot-
steps, enacting similar laws against political speech. Less visible than
the Kremlin, smaller Eurasian countries have pushed free speech in-
fringement further, perhaps forecasting the potential results of the
Russian laws. Kazakhstan provides a recent example. Similar to the
election protests in Russia, Kazakhstan has seen numerous labor
strikes and terrorist acts over the past year and has subsequently been
the site of considerable protest.66  During the peak of the rioting, all
telecommunication was cut off, and Twitter was blocked throughout
the country.67 Journalists were banned from going to observe the pro-
tests.68 Ever since, Kazakhstan has clamped down on the media.69 The
nation’s information minister, Darkhan Mynbai, announced in Sep-
tember 2012 that media coverage of “emergency situations,” including
natural disasters and terrorist acts, would be strictly censored.70 The
new policy’s purported aim is to dispel rumors, but Mynbai’s explana-
tion suggests that, like Russia’s Act for Information, the Kazakh regu-
62 Dara Kerr, Amendments to U.N. Treaty Could Censor the Internet, CNET NEWS,




65 The version of the Treaty that was accepted and signed by 140 countries at the
December 2012 World Conference on International Communications authorized
prohibition of spam only. Secretary General of the International Telecommunica-
tion Union, Dr. Hamoudoun Toure, stressed that the amendment was not “con-
tent-related.” Naushad K. Cherrayil, New U.N. Telecoms Treaty Signed in Dubai,
Dec. 14, 2012, GULF NEWS, http://gulfnews.com/business/telecoms/new-un-
telecoms-treaty-signed-in-dubai-1.1118727.
66 Minister’s Announcement Could Augur Drastic Increase in Censorship, Report-
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lations will go further: “ ‘Questioning the veracity of [official]
information or the spokesperson’s competence, criticizing the actions
undertaken by authorities, and inciting citizens to act in one way or
another’ will be forbidden ‘in all media – TV, print, and Internet.’”71
Belarus has outdone Russia with its Internet monitoring lead-
ing up to the nation’s 2012 elections.72 In August, a human rights
watch organization, Viasna, reported that the Belarusian government
had blocked news websites expressing viewpoints oppositional to Pres-
ident Aleksandr Lukashenko (who is known throughout the global
community as “Europe’s Last Dictator”).73 Authorities also censored
electoral addresses on statewide television made by Lukashenko’s op-
posing party and omitted any “references to the plight of Belarus’s po-
litical prisoners or Belarus’s serious economic crisis.”74
“Lukashenk[o]’s attitude towards the media is summed up by his
statement that he ‘supports a free press as long as it is responsible and
helps his presidency.’”75
Similar to Lukashenko’s actions to censor media leading up to
the 2012 elections, in the months prior to a 1996 referendum, the pres-
ident prohibited his opponents from using the government-operated
media but continued using it himself.76 Prior to the 2001 presidential
election, which Lukashenko won with a staggering 76 percent of the
vote, government officials confiscated the publishing equipment of one
independent newspaper and closed down two other independent print-
ing houses.77
Russia could do the same. Substantively, opposing parties’ po-
litical platforms are not far removed from Navalny’s Good Machine of
Truth. Eventually, Russian speech laws could become as strict as
other suffering democracies like Ecuador, which enacted a new media
law outlawing articles “that ‘have a bearing, in favor of or against any
71 Id.
72 Opposition Journalists and Cyber Dissidents Hounded in Run-Up to Election,
Reporters without Borders via INTERNEWS, Sept. 3, 2012, http://en.rsf.org/belarus-
opposition-journalists-and-cyber-03-09-2012,43321.html.
73 Id.; see also Eric R. Reed, Descent into Authoritarianism: Barriers to Constitu-
tional Rule in Belarus, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 147, 151 (2004-2005);
Andrej Dynko, Belarus: Europe’s Last Dictatorship, N.Y TIMES, July 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/opinion/belarus-europes-last-dictatorship.htm
l?_r=0 (noting Condoleezza Rice first coined the expression ‘Belarus as Europe’s
last dictatorship’ in 2006).
74 Opposition Journalists and Cyber Dissidents Hounded in Run-Up to Election,
supra note 72.
75 Reed, supra note 73 (citing RETT A. LUDWICKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN
THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET DOMINANCE 100, 101 (1996)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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candidate, proposal, option, electoral preference or political thesis.’”78
Similarly, the Egyptian government removed every Al-Dustour news-
paper from the stands when, following the country’s first presidential
election, it ran an article criticizing the president’s political
affiliation.79
Even if political speeches themselves, like those blacked out in
Belarus, are not deemed extremist by Russian authorities, it will be
very difficult for Putin’s political opponents to generate a following
without being able to communicate and disseminate information
online.80
C. Laws Curbing Public Gatherings
The issue is confounded by citizens’ inability to gather publicly
under the newly amended Law on Rallies.81 New measures were en-
acted on the eve of a scheduled mass demonstration in June, imposing
steep fines on those who either organize or participate in unapproved
rallies, or whose rallies are allowed but violate strict new conditions on
78 Frida Ghitis, New ‘Democracies’ Failing if Speech Isn’t Free, CNN, Aug. 22,
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/22/opinion/ghitis-press-freedom/index.html.
79 Id. Every issue was removed from the newsstands when Al-Dustour newspaper
published accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood (of which newly-elected
President Mohamed Morsy was a member) after the country’s first presidential
election. Id. The newspaper’s editor, Islam Affi, and other journalists from the pa-
per were charged with insulting the President. Id. The Egyptian legislature re-
cently hand-picked fifty new newspaper editors; including Salah Abdel Maksoud, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood who Morsy selected as Information Minister.
Id. But see Egypt Bans Detention of Journalists, Islam Afifi, Editor of Opposition
Paper Charged with Insulting President Morsi, Released After President Issues De-
cree, GUARDIAN, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/24/
egypt-bans-detention-journalists (noting even after President Morsy released Affi
and issued a decree banning detention of journalists, Affi was still tried in
September).
80 With the potential to blacklist all of YouTube, the Russian censorship laws are
reminiscent of Iran’s Internet policies. Like Russia, Iran is known for torturing
and imprisoning journalists as well as blocking unflattering websites. Addition-
ally, the Iranian government has vowed to stop using the Internet by the end of
2013 because it is “untrustworthy.” Samuel Blackstone, Iran Plans To Stop Using
the Internet by 2013, BUS. INSIDER, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/
iran-plans-to-stop-using-the-internet-by-2013-2012-8. Iran’s goal to abandon the
global Internet follow in the footsteps of North Korea and Cuba, which have both
opted for a national intranet. Id.
81 Main Amendments to Laws on Rallies, supra note 46; see David M. Her-
szenhorn, New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protestors, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-law-
with-harsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html.
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demonstration permits.82 The amended fines for violations—up to
$9,000 for individual participants, $18,000 for organizers, and $30,000
for groups or companies— are nearly triple those that existed prior to
the amendments.83 The heightened penalties are astronomical when
considering that the average Russian’s annual income is $8,500.84 The
risk of such a steep fine will likely scare members of the middle class
from protesting at all.85 In addition to the increase in fines for viola-
tors, the amended law prohibits anyone with prior convictions for dis-
sidence from organizing demonstrations.86 Incidentally, this provision
would forbid Alexei Navalny from leading any more rallies and would
ban the members of Pussy Riot from organizing demonstrations.
The Law on Rallies gives government officials considerable lev-
erage to suppress the “antigovernment street protests” that erupted
and have been brewing since the presidential and Duma elections.87
The mere threat of sanctions has already proven effective in prevent-
ing protests.88 Sergei Mitrokhin, the leader of a liberal opposition
party, responded to the law as an overarching “ban on rallies and polit-
ical actions.”89 He told a news agency, “Now, anyone can be punished
with slave’s work or an astounding fine. I cannot call people to a rally
knowing in advance that from there they may be sent to the galleys.”90
Again, the amendments to the Law on Rallies could conceiva-
bly be interpreted to outlaw a wide array of public meetings. Now that
extremist speech is banned from the Internet, how can Russians ex-
change opinions and information? The Law on Rallies has the poten-
tial to prohibit even the most non-threatening of information sessions
or town hall meetings. Taken in concert with the Act for Information
and anti-extremism laws, the new amendments, read broadly, have
the power to restrict all political speech outside of the home.
82 See Herszenhorn, supra note 81.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Russia Protest Bill: Vladimir Putin Supports Controversial Anti-Protest
Law, HUFFINGTON POST, May 23, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/
russia-protest-bill-president-vladimir-putin_n_1538990.html.
86 Main Amendments to Laws on Rallies, supra note 46; see also Herszenhorn,
supra note 81 (“[A]ll evidence indicated that the law was forced through the State
Duma by the presidential administration, [. . .] a grave mistake given the apparent
trampling of constitutional rights. [. . .] ‘People who do not agree with the authori-
ties turn out not to have full rights.’”).
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D. Extra-Legal Methods of Stamping Out Dissident Speech
It is important to point out that the new legislation is not the
first time Russian officials have attempted to monitor speech.91 Nor is
legislation the only means through which Putin and former leaders
have controlled discourse.92 The most significant curtailment of free
speech still occurs outside of the legislature, aided by widespread in-
timidation tactics.93 Over the past few decades, the Russian govern-
ment has strong-armed the media by making examples of unwelcome
outspokenness.94
For example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been in a Siberian
prison since challenging then-Prime Minister Putin in 2003.95
Khodorkovsky was the owner of a prominent oil company and the rich-
est man in Russia when he accused Putin of being corrupt.96 Consid-
ered Putin’s “biggest political liability,” Khorkovsky was imprisoned
and convicted in two ludicrous show trials.97 Much like the Pussy Riot
trials, where the defendants awaited their verdict in cages, the public-
ity and harshness of Khorkovsky’s treatment sent a stern message to
other potential dissidents.98
More than prosecution, the assassination of journalists has
also effectively silenced much anti-Kremlin sentiment in the media.
Fifty-four journalists have been murdered in Russia since 1992.99 Al-
most 40 percent of the slain writers covered war.100 One-third covered
government corruption, another one-third covered politics, and one-
quarter of the journalists who were killed wrote on crime.101
The most notable journalist assassinated was Anna Politkov-
skaya, who was gunned down in 2006 in broad daylight before her fi-
nal novel, A Russian Diary: A Journalist’s Final Account of a Country
91 See, e.g., Masha Gessen, The Wrath of Putin, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2012, http://
www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/04/vladimir-putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-rus-
sia; Journalists Killed in Russia, COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF JOURNAL-
ISTS, supra note 15. In 2010, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists listed
Russia as the fourth-most dangerous nation in the world for journalists.
92 The Wrath of Putin, supra note 91; Journalists Killed in Russia, supra note 15.
93 Journalists Killed in Russia, supra note 15.
94 Id.
95 Masha Gessen, supra note 91.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See generally id. (describing the apparent lack of freedom and law in Russian
society).
99 Journalists Killed in Russia, supra note 15.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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Moving Backward,102 was published, and after having recently com-
pleted Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy.103 Investigators de-
termined that the assassin had stalked the renowned journalist for
five days but waited to kill her until October 7, Putin’s birthday.104
Though Politkovskaya’s murder was never solved, the consensus
among investigators is that the motive was to intimidate Russian jour-
nalists who might find themselves, like Politkovskaya, inclined to con-
demn President Putin.105 The top investigator on the murder, Petros
Garibyan, made his opinion about the killer’s motive clear:  “First and
foremost, [the killer] sought a demonstrative and resonant act aimed
at intimidating all of you—journalists—as well as society and the
authorities.”106
Prophetically, Politkovskaya wrote in an article two years
before her death:
“We are hurtling back into the Soviet abyss, into an in-
formation vacuum that spells death from our own igno-
rance. All we have left is the [I]nternet, where
information is still freely available. For the rest, if you
want to go on working as a journalist, it’s total servility
to Putin. Otherwise, it can be death, the bullet, poison, or
trial—whatever our secret services, Putin’s guard dogs,
see fit.”107
Sadly, Russia’s Act for Information now controls what Politkov-
skaya felt was the last hope for free speech.
IV. PROJECTING THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY
Free speech is of focal importance for the health and longevity
of a democracy. The anti-extremism law, Act for Information blacklist
law, and amendments to the Law on Rallies systematically strip Rus-
sians of their ability to voice and, perhaps more importantly, hear
opinions about their government. Unable to access information about
the opposition movement, the Russian people will no longer have a
stake in the government. Each of the recently enacted free speech laws
is disconcerting on its own. Taken in sum, however, the laws signal a
102 ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A RUSSIAN DIARY: A JOURNALIST’S FINAL ACCOUNT OF A
COUNTRY MOVING BACKWARD (2007).
103 ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, PUTIN’S RUSSIA: LIFE IN A FAILING DEMOCRACY (2004).
104 Anna Kordunsky, Russian Investigator Speaks about Anna Politkovskaya Kill-




107 Anna Politskovskaya, Poisoned by Putin, GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 2004, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/09/russia.media.
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troubling and ominous retreat for the Russian Federation into a re-
gime reminiscent of the Soviet era.
The aim, or at least a major practical consequence, of these
practices seems to be self-regulation. Just as the numerous assassina-
tions of journalists has intimidated many in the field into backing off
of their criticism of Putin, the threat of steep financial penalties and
imprisonment will scare many citizens into silence. Even those who
are unafraid, like Navalny and Khordorkovsky, will eventually be ar-
rested, prosecuted, and incarcerated. Once enough dissidents are
jailed, there will be less need for enforcement and fewer occasions for
oversight. Fortunately, the Pussy Riot scandal has brought attention
to the potential for governmental abuse of the new legislation; how-
ever, because of Putin’s systemic stronghold over the legislature and
silencing of political discourse, short of a revolution, little can be done
to oust him.108
108 See generally David Hearst, Putin’s Repressive Regime Has Frozen Russia’s
Heart, Guardian, Dec. 21, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/
dec/21/putins-repressive-regime-frozen-russia-heart (describing recent legislative
action and suggesting that the only way to get rid of Putin is through “Russia’s
next perestroika”).

